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 1. Introduction 
The role of active innovation efforts in fostering economic growth is largely 
recognized in the endogenous growth literature [see e.g. Romer (1990)] and 
therefore highlights non-negligible challenges for developing economies to 
meet the technological gap. In a globalized context the competitive pressure is 
likely to become more important and increasingly requires the pursual of 
innovative activities that might require well coordinated government policies. In 
fact, innovation in developing countries is often incipient and not rarely 
important multinational firms tend to undertake R&D investments in their 
headquarters in other countries.  
The Brazilian economy is large and shows the coexistence of 
technologically dynamic sectors with traditional sectors with low technological 
effort and constitutes an interesting case for investigating issues associated 
with the design of innovation policies. A handful of studies, as for example, 
Resende and Hasenclever (1998), De Negri et al. (2005) and Kannebley et al. 
(2005) pointed out the reduced technological effort that has prevailed in that 
economy. A natural question is to what extent active government policies can 
induce a significant degree of innovation by firms. Indeed, in Brazil a varied set 
of often uncoordinated incentive policies to innovation have been adopted and 
comprised special sectoral funds, favourable loans and most notably fiscal 
incentives policies [see Bastos (2004)]. 
The different forms of interrelatedness of innovation policies possess distinct  
policy implications. In that sense, a growing interest has emerged in connection     
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with the empirical assessment of complementarities in innovation policies as 
exemplified by  Arora and Gambardella (1990), Arora (1996), Ichniowski et al., 
(1997)  and Miravete and Pernias (2006) in terms of indirect approaches. The 
possibility of a given innovation activity positively affecting the return of other 
activities characterizes a complementarity and a direct approach in a discrete 
setting has been advanced by Mohnen and Röller (2005). The evidence for four 
European countries indicated that the prevalence of complementarities depend 
on the phase of the innovation process. The propensity to innovate would be 
better stimulated by a package of policies whereas the intensity of innovation 
would call for more specific targeted policies.  
The aforementioned approach is promising and is here considered in the 
context of the Brazilian industries. The motivation for the paper builds on at 
least three aspects: 
a)  The scarcity of related works in the context of developing economies; 
b) The possibility of avoiding micro-aggregation of the data and the potential 
related biases; 
c)  The consideration of estimators that acknowledge the complex sampling of 
the innovation survey; 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses some 
conceptual aspects associated with the assessment of complementarities in 
innovation policies and econometric strategies for assessing it. The third 
section discusses the data source, the empirical model. The fourth section 





                     2. Complementarity in Innovation 
2.1- Conceptual Aspects 
The empirical assessment of complementarities in innovation activities can 
be object of a variety of research strategies [see Athey and Stern (1998)) for an 
overview]. Indirect frameworks include the “correlation approach” and the so- 
called “reduced form approach”. The former approach emphasizes the association 
between different choice variables with varying degrees of theoretical foundation 
[see e.g. Arora and Gambardella (1990), Ichniowski et al., (1997) and Miravete and 
Pernias (2006)] whereas the latter focuses on exclusion restrictions and highlights 
similar effects of exogenous variables on complementary variables [see e.g. 
Holmstrom e Milgrom (1994)] 
A more direct approach considers special features of an innovation function 
where complementarities in innovation policy would be associated to the 
supermodularity of that function. Examples include Mohnen and Röller (2005) and 
Lokshin et al. (2007). The present paper closely follows the approach advanced by 
the former authors. The assessment of discrete complementarities requires that 
one imposes a lattice ordered structure in the domain of the innovation function 
and evaluates the possibility of supermodularity of  that function.
1 The prevalence 
of complementarities in innovation policies relates to situations where the whole 
exceeds the sum of the parts for some innovative outcome variable. Let I(a, θ) 
represent a general innovation function where a= (a1,…,ak) denotes a set of 
                                                 




government policies variables and θI indicates other relevant control variables that 
might portray institutional and characteristics that can be firm or sector-specific. 
Supermodularity of that function would prevail if for all combinations of actions a’ 
and  a’’, holds:
2 
) , ' ' ( ) , ' ( ) ), ' ' ' (( ) ), ' ' ' (( θ θ θ θ a I a I a a I a a I + ≥ ∨ + ∧  (1) 
 
The previous definition is more readily understood if one considers an 
example with A={(0,0),(1,1),(0,1),(1,0)}. Supermodularity would prevail if 
I(1,0)+I(0,1)  ≤ I(1,1)+I(0,0) or yet I(1,0)-I(0,0) ≤ I(1,1)-I(0,1). This inequality 
indicates that the reward for increasing a given activity is higher when the other 
activity is already undertaken. The analysis becomes more complex as the number 
of inequalities to be considered increases with the number of available policies. A 
convenient result was advanced by Topkis (1978) and allows to focus on pairwise 
analyses as a function is supermodular over a subset of its arguments, if and only 
if all pairwise components in the subset satisfy the previous definition. 





) 2 ( 2
k
i
k i  non trivial 
restrictions to be tested. In particular, in the application considered by Mohnen and 
Röller (2005) and in the present paper there are 24 restrictions to be considered 
since k =4 in those cases. 
In practice, the government policies are often not observed in survey data, 
and one might need to rely on indirect measures that indicate perceived obstacles 
to innovation. One would then define Ck = −ak, where Ck (k = 1,…, K), indicate  the 
                                                 
2  A related relevant concept defines that a function f is said to submodular if - f  is supermodular.  
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innovation obstacles faced by the firm. The innovation function in that case would 
be given by: 
) 2 ( ) , , , , , , ( ) , ( 1 θ θ k C C f C I =  
In that case where one has inverse proxies for innovation, the interpretation 
should be more careful. For barriers that have complementarities, specific target 
policies targeted policies should be considered, whereas the case of  a substitution 
pattern between barriers would call for packages of innovation policies since the 
reduction of  a given barrier exacerbates the effect of the remaining. 
2.2- Empirical Implementation and Econometric Issues 
The aforementioned innovation function can be empirically considered in 
terms of the expression below: 
i j ij ij
l
i Z S I
k





   (3) 
 
where, Ii represents some outcome of the innovative activity by firm i, Sj 
refers to dummy variables indicating the prevalence of  a given combination of 
policies, Zt denote the remaining exogenous variables,  j η  and  i ε  are respectively 
sectoral  fixed effects and the error term.  
A first econometric issue that arise refers to the consistent estimation of 
equation (3).  To address it, one needs to indicate the phase of the innovation 
process that is being considered. In the investigation of the propensity to innovate 
one observes data with both innovating and non-innovating firms and therefore 
standard models for limited dependent variable can be used (for example a probit 
model). The evaluation of the intensity of innovation, however, is more complex as  
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one would observe data on intensity only for innovating firms and therefore one is 
facing a truncated distribution. A traditional approach is to consider Heckman´s two 
step procedure where the inverse Mills ratio from an initial probit regression with 
the full sample is regressed as an additional correction term on the final ordinary 
least squares regression. The procedure known as heckit is often called 
generalized tobit.
3 
Another aspect that was neglected in the literature pertains the 
consideration of a weighted maximum likelihood estimation to account for complex 
sampling design. In fact, survey respondents are selected in accordance with 
distinct sampling weights and different modern statistical and econometric 
packages already incorporate the related procedures data [Kish (1965) and Silva et 
al. (2002) provide useful discussions on complex sampling] 
A second econometric issue relates to the implementation of the tests for 
supermodularity of the innovation function that is considered for pairs of policies. 
Assuming a total of 4 policies, for policies 1 and 2 one has to face restrictions 
associated with 4 inequalities (where XX = {00,01,10,11}): 
XX XX XX XX 11 00 01 10 γ γ γ γ + ≤ +    (4) 
whereas for pairs 1 and  3 one would have: 
X X X X X X X X 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 γ γ γ γ + ≤ +  (5) 
and for polícies 2 and 3: 
X X X X X X X X 11 00 01 10 γ γ γ γ + ≤ +  (6) 
                                                 
3  See Greene (2003) for an introductory discussion.  
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In order to prevail complementarity among policies 1 ,2 and 3, it is 
necessary not to reject the validity of the null hypothesis relating to those 
restrictions in all tests. Similarly, the same follows in the case of inclusion of the 
fourth incentive policy.  
The hypothesis test needs to consider multiple linear restructions.  Letting, 
with slight abuse of notation, the k coefficients be represented by the vector b 
(kx1), the inequality test assesses the null hypothesis H0  =  Rb  ≤0 against the 
alternative hypothesis H1 = Rb  ≥0, where R is a pxk matrix, p is the number of 
restrictions, and under the null hypothesis a strict inequaliity holds for at least one 
of the restrictions. The relevant test statistic is provided by Kodde e Palm (1986)): 
) ( ) ( )) ( (
1 b b R R R b b R
T T − Ω − =
−
w c  (7) 
where b indicates  a consistent estimator for the parameter vector and b refers to 
the estimator that minimizes the previous expression subject to the null hypothesis.  
Gourieroux et al. (1981) and Wolak (1989, 1991) have shown that the appropriate 
a statistic for such test follows a weighted chi-square distribution. The probability of 
the test statistic exceeding c under the null hypothesis is given by ∑ ≤
i
i i w c). Pr(
2 χ , 
where wi is the relevant weight [see e.g. Shapiro (1985) and Wolak (1989)].
4 The 
relevant critical values appear in table 1 from Kodde e Palm (1986). The lower and 
upper bounds (cl and cu) at significance levels ranging from 0.25 up to 0.001 and 
degrees of freedom fro 1 to 40 for tests involving multiple equalities and 
                                                 




5 If the test statistic lies between cl and cu the test would not be 
conclusive. It is important to stress that consistent estimation of the coefficients is 
required for implementing the test and potential endogeneities could pose an 
important challenge. Mohnen e Röller (2005), however, ponder that such caveat 
does not directly jeopardizes the analysis  as even with inconsistent estimates, the 
error term  would be correlated with the interaction terms and not with the practices 
themselves. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
 
3.1- Data 
The study relies on a comprehensive survey on technological innovation in 
the context of the Brazilian industry [Pesquisa de Inovação Tecnológica-PINTEC, 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística-IBGE].6 The referred survey 
considers active firms with main revenues associated with extractive or 
manufacturing industry and with 10 or more employees. We were granted special 
access to the micro data of PINTEC-2003. It is important to stress that the 
questionnaire closely follows the one from the Community Innovation Survey (CIS 
1) that was conducted for European countries and used by Mohnen and Röller 
(2005). Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that in the Brazilian case one does 
not face a micro-aggregation limitation. The survey was carried out in 2000, 2003 
                                                 
5  Following Kodde and Palm (1986), the degrees of freedom equal one plus the number of 
equalities tested for the lower bound and the total number of equalities and inequalities for the 
upper bound. 
6  The questionnaire and other details are presented in IBGE (2005)  
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and 2005. The quantitative data and a few qualitative ones (like for example 
unfinshed projects) refer to the current year of the survey. The majority of the 
qualitative data refer to the period of the current year and the 2 consecutive 
previous one (in the case of PINTEC-2003, from 2001 until 2003). 
A stratified sampling procedure is adopted where the first stratum is defined 
in accordance with the probability of the firm being an innovator. The allocation of a 
firm to a stratum depends on a set of indicators (primary and secondary). The first 
subset, the certain stratum, comprises large firms (with 500 or more employees) or 
yet firms that had declared themselves as innovators in the previous edition of the 
survey that are included with probability 1. 
Two additional classes of stratum are considered in terms of the eligible and 
non-eligible categories, In the former one includes firms with reasonable chances 
of being innovators whereas in the latter  one includes firms with slim or none 
chance of being innovators. 
In order to guarantee reliable information for the different regions, a second 
stratum level considered different cut-off points depending on the importance of the 
economic activity. In the case of the most important industrial state (São Paulo), for 
example the criterion was 80 % of the industrial transformation value. The selection 
of the sample in the final stratum considers selection probability that is proportional 
to the square root of the number of employees. Altogether, the previous 
observations indicate a complex stratified sampling that should be acknowledged 
in the estimation as the Brazilian case is characterized by non-negligible sectoral 
and geographical heterogeneities.  
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Prior to defining the sample, we excluded firms with R&D intensity above 
50% that could be outliers, Moreover, sectoral dummies were considered in terms 
of 16 industrial sector was considered (in terms of the Classificação Nacional de 
Atividades Econômicas-CNAE-IBGE). The referred sectors are listed in the 
appendix. Next we describe the variables considered in the econometric 
estimation. 
Table 1 – Definition of variables 
 
Endogenous variables: 
Propensity to innovateDummy variable assumes value 1 if the firm has innovated in process or 
product, for the market or only for the firm, and. 0 otherwise. 
Intensity of innovationRevenues from innovating products divided by total revenues when the main 
market is national, and net exports of innovating products divided by total 
exports when the main market is abroad. 
Exogenous variables: 
Log(EMP)  Logarithm of the number of employees. 
Foreign  Dummy variable assumes value 1 if the firm has dominant share of foreign 
capital and 0 otherwise 
Group  Dummy variable assumes value 1 if the firm is part of a group and 0 
otherwise. 
Organizational  Dummy variable assumes value 1 if the firm implemented  a significant 
organizational change and 0 otherwise. 
Exporting  Dummy variable assumes value 1 if the firm exports and 0 otherwise. 
R&D intensity  R&D expenses divided by net  sales  revenues 
Continuous  Dummy variable assumes value 1 if the firm  makes continuous R&D 
expenditures and 0 otherwise. 
Cooperation  Dummy variable assumes value 1 if the firm cooperates with other institutions 
and 0 otherwise. 
Sectoral dummies  Dummy variables for the sectors listed in the appendix  
Regional dummies  Dummy variables for the Brazilian macro regions (North, Midwest, Northeast, 
Southeast, South) 
Obstacles to innovation (dummy variables constructed upon combinations) 
O1  Lack of appropriate finance sources 
O2  Lack of skilled personnel 
O3  Lack of  opportunities for cooperation with other firms/institutions 
O4  Lack of information on technology or on the market 
 
The variables are similar to those considered in Mohnen and Röller (2005), 
As for policies variables we also focus on perceived obstacles to innovation, but 
consider the categories referring to risk and finance, knowledge-skill within  
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enterprise and Knowledge-skill outside the enterprise, In the first category we 
considered the obstacle referring to the lack of appropriate sources of finance. In 
the second category, we considered the lack of skilled personnel and lack of 
information on technology or on the market. In the third category, we focused on 
the lack of opportunities for cooperation with other firms/institutions. Next, tables 2 
and 3 display some basic summary statistics and indicate substantial 
heterogeneity, 
 




error  Confidence interval 95% 
Propensity to innovate  0.330 0.007  0.315  0.344 
Intensity of innovation  0.088 0.004  0.080  0.096 
Number of employees  49.08 0.690  47.71  50.44 
                        Source: PINTEC-IBGE, 2003 
 
Table 3 - Summary statistics (expanded sample) 
  Did not innovate  Did innovate 
   Mean  Std. error  Confidence interval 95%  Mean  Std. error  Confidence interval 95% 
Foreign  0.014 0.002 0.011 0.017 0.030 0.002 0.025 0.034 
Group  0.025 0.002 0.020 0.029 0.043 0.004 0.035 0.050 
Organizational  0.584 0.010 0.565 0.603 0.834 0.010 0.813 0.854 
R&D intensity  - - - -  0.007  0.001  0.005  0.008 
Continuous  - - - -  0.071  0.005  0.062  0.080 
Cooperation  - - - -  0.029  0.003  0.022  0.036 




                                                 
7 Summary statistics of the sample are available upon request   
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Table 4, in particular, provides an idea of the relative importance of the 
perceived obstacles to innovation. 
 
Table 4 - Relative frequency of obstacles to innovation (expanded sample) 
No obstacle was encountered 69.00%
Finance source  28.16%
Skilled personnel  12.80%
Opportunities for  cooperation with other firms/institutions 7.88%
Information on technology or market 12.30%
High economic risks  24.74%
Scarcity of adequate technological services 6.67%
                        Source: PINTEC-IBGE, 2003 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we present the empirical results from the econometric 
estimation that were carried out with Stata SE 10.0.An important feature of that 
software is that it allows to incorporate sampling weights in the maximum likelihood 
estimation. The related results appear in tables 5 and 6.  For conciseness reasons, 
we do not report the results regarding the sectoral and regional dummies, but 
important differences emerge when comparing estimates that incorporate complex 
sampling or not. We will use the results that incorporate sampling weights as 
presented in table 5 as our preferential results. The results depends on the phase 
of the innovation process, In the equation referring to the propensity of innovation 
the regional dummies exert no significant effect  when one considers individual 
coefficients, In the case of sectoral dummies only coefficient is clearly significant 
and two others are marginally significant. As for the variables indicating 
combination of obstacles we will not emphasize the discussion of individual 
coefficients but rather discuss complementarity tests later in this section. Some  
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other plausible results emerge in terms of positive and significant coefficients for 
the firm size variable (LEMP), the organizational change variable and for the 
exporting variables that is denotative of competitive pressures.  
When one considers the intensity of innovation, the previous results 
essentially prevail but additionally one observes a clearly significant positive 
coefficient for organizational change, Moreover, if a significance level slightly 
above 5 % is considered, it is possible to detect important positive effects accruing 
from ownership, participation in groups and R&D intensity. 
Next, we consider the main issue of the paper namely that of testing for the 
presence of complementarities in innovation policies (or obstacles to innovation).
8 
The interpretation of the test statistics reported in table 7  run as follows. Values 
above the upper bound critical value at a 10% as given by 7.094  indicate  a 
rejection of the null hypothesis. Values below lower bound critical value of 1.642 
would favour acceptance of hypothesis, whereas intermediate values between the 
referred bounds would indicate that the test is inconclusive. When the test focuses 
on supermodularity, acceptance of the null hypothesis would indicate the 
prevalence of complementarity in obstacles to innovation. When submodularity is 
considered instead, the acceptance of the null hypothesis would signal the 
presence of substitutability in obstacles to innovation.  
In the study of Mohnen and Röller (2005) the results were clear cut in the 
sense that in general substitutability in obstacles to innovation prevailed when 
considering the propensity to innovate and complementarity was salient when one 
                                                 
8  We thank  Pierre Mohnen for kindly providing the Gauss code for implementing the inequality 
restrictions tests.  
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considers the intensity of innovation. In the present investigation the results are 
less clear. 
Starting with the assessment of the propensity to innovate the results are 
not strong and do not spread along several different pairs of obstacles. There is 
evidence of complementary of obstacles between the lack of information on 
technology or markets (OBS4) and lack of skilled personnel (OBS2) and yet lack of 
cooperation opportunities (OBS3). For example, for the pair of obstacles 2-4 the 
test statistic would be 0.321 and favour supermodularity (complementarity). The 
test for submodularity, on the other hand, only favours the acceptance of the null 
hypothesis of substitutability between lack of finance sources and lack of 
information (pair 1-4). 
When we consider the intensity of innovation, the results are stronger. In the 
case of the test for supermodularity we cannot reject the null hypothesis for any of 
the pairs (the largest value for the test statistics was 1.593 for pair 2-3). As for the 
test of submodularity evidence indicates substitutability between lack of 
cooperation opportunities with both lack of finance sources and lack of skilled 
personnel (respectively pairs 1-3 and 2-3). Please note that pair 2-3 shows 
ambivalent evidence and given the generous confidence level adopted one should 
refrain from a strong conclusion in that case. Finally, submodularity appears to 
prevail between lack of cooperation opportunities and lack of information (pair 3-4). 
Altogether, the evidence contrasts somewhat with previous evidence for 
European counties. In particular, there is only limited evidence for substitutability or 
complementarity for few pairs of obstacles. When one considers the intensity of  
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innovation the evidence strongly indicates the presence of complementary 
obstacles,  
 
Table 5 – Regression results (models using sampling weights) 
     Propensity to innovate  Intensity of innovation  Variables 
coef. std.  error  p-value coef.  std.  error  p-value 
Log(EMP)  0.091 0.021  0.000  -0.044  0.009  0.000 
Foreign  0.087 0.089  0.332  0.055  0.029  0.061 
Group  0.097 0.093  0.297  0.072  0.040  0.074 
Organizational  0.649 0.052  0.000  -0.145  0.033  0.000 
Exporting.  0.205 0.054  0.000  -0.044  0.023  0.055 
R&D intensity  - -  -    0.504  0.267  0.059 
Continuous  - -    -  0.023  0.024  0.342 
Cooperation  - -    -  0.035  0.038  0.348 
States:              
0001  -0.742 0.444  0.095  0.288  0.167  0.087 
0010  -0.150 0.692  0.828  0.676  0.274  0.014 
0011  1.650 0.715  0.021  0.291  0.169  0.085 
0100  -0.021 0.472  0.964  0.398  0.162  0.014 
0101  0.318 0.474  0.503  0.362  0.155  0.020 
0110  -0.759 0.725  0.295  0.286  0.220  0.193 
0111  0.342 0.677  0.613  0.442  0.211  0.036 
1000  -0.808 0.341  0.018  0.473  0.154  0.002 
1001  -0.699 0.356  0.050  0.426  0.156  0.006 
1010  -0.739 0.380  0.052  0.531  0.168  0.002 
1011  -0.488 0.372  0.189  0.429  0.167  0.010 
1100  -0.916 0.353  0.009  0.503  0.160  0.002 
1101  -0.323 0.350  0.356  0.453  0.155  0.004 
1110  -0.459 0.384  0.231  0.511  0.172  0.003 
1111  -0.198 0.353  0.574  0.404  0.155  0.009 
0000  -1.073 0.336  0.001  0.489  0.152  0.001 




Table 6 – Regression results (models not using sampling weights) 
     Propensity to innovate  Intensity of innovation  Variables 
coef. std.  error  p-value coef.  std.  error  p-value 
Log(EMP)  0.138 0.013  0.000  0.007  0.015  0.650 
Foreign  0.122 0.059  0.037  0.085  0.029  0.003 
Group  -0.010 0.051  0.851  0.036  0.025  0.148 
Organizational  0.679 0.035  0.000  0.176  0.080  0.027 
Exporting.  0.249 0.035  0.000  0.051  0.030  0.088 
R&D intensity         0.386  0.202  0.056 
Continuous         0.047  0.017  0.005 
Cooperation         0.042  0.024  0.070 
States:              
0001  -1.600 0.290  0.000  -0.680  0.335  0.043 
0010  -1.156 0.481  0.016  -0.226  0.341  0.508 
0011  -0.481 0.585  0;411  -0.342  0.307  0.266 
0100  -0.632 0.306  0.039  -0.372  0.264  0.159 
0101  -0.621 0.326  0.057  -0.471  0;265  0.076 
0110  -1.349 0.498  0.007  -0.231  0.370  0.533 
0111  -0.810 0.437  0.064  -0.269  0.301  0.371 
1000  -1.503 0.218  0.000  -0.626  0.314  0.047 
1001  -1.364 0.229  0.000  -0.564  0.304  0.064 
1010  -1.418 0.241  0.000  -0.532  0.312  0.088 
1011  -1.232 0.245  0.000  -0.529  0.297  0.077 
1100  -1,435 0.228  0.000  -0,542  0.310  0.080 
1101  -1.086 0.225  0.000  -0.472  0.280  0.092 
1110  -1.239 0.252  0.000  -0.530  0.299  0.076 
1111  -0.964 0.228  0.000  -0.452  0.272  0.097 
0000  -1.868 0.215  0.000  -0.722  0.349  0.038 
Lambda       0.531  0.1576988    0.001   
 
 
Table 7 – Wald tests for inequality restrictions (at the 10 % significance level, the 




innovate             Intensity of innovation       
Pair of 
obstacles 
1-2  1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4    1-2 1-3 1-4 2-3 2-4 3-4 
  Supermodularity  test:            
  12.826 10.766 4.238 9.148 0.321 1.555   1.145 0.918 1.26 1.593 0.002 1.038
  Submodularity test:            
    4.178 2.545  0.266  1.79 5.755 3.366  3.367 0.337 3.847 0.151 5.2 0.694
Definition of obstacles: 1 – Lack of appropriate finance sources; 2 - Lack of skilled personnel;  
3 - Lack of  opportunities for cooperation with other firms/institutions; 4 - Lack of information on 




5. Final Comments 
The paper aimed at investigating the presence of complementarities in 
innovation policies in the Brazilian industry in term of inverse proxies for innovation 
(obstacles). The paper benefits from micro-data that are not subject to limitations 
related to micro-aggregation and explicitly considered sampling weights in the 
estimations. The analysis considered tests fot supermodularity and submodularity 
of an innovation function taking as references obstacles to innovation referring to 
lack of adequate finance sources, lack of skilled personnel, lack of opportunities for 
cooperation with other firms/institutions and lack of information on technology or on 
the market. The study highlighted the different phases of the innovation process in 
terms of the propensity of innovation (in terms of a Probit model) and the intensity 
of innovation (in terms of a generalized Tobit model).  
The results did not indicate clear distinct patterns in the two phases of the 
innovation process like in Mohnen and Röller (2005). In fact, we find limited 
evidence favouring substitutability and complementarity in obstacles in the case of 
the propensity to innovate. Specifically, there is some evidence that suggests the 
relevance of a package of policies relating to finance sources and information on 
technology or the market. On the other hand, if we consider the intensity of 
innovation the evidence is stronger and indicates complementarities of obstacles 
and the need for more targeted policies.  
Even though the results are suggestive, stronger policy recommendations 
would be clearer if further research combines different years of that survey in the 
future. Additionally, the reliance on an indirect approach based on obstacles to 
innovations has shortcomings. Indeed, the perception that innovation has been  
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curbed by some particular obstacle can be subjective as one is not sure that an 
innovation would actually occur if that barrier did not prevail. A relevant extension 
should consider direct measures reflecting actual incentive policies for innovation, 
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Definitions of the industrial sectors 
 
Sector CNAE  codes 
Number of 
firms  % 
Extractive  10, 11, 13, 14  1863  2,25%
Food, drinks and tobacco  15 e 16  10400  12,56%
Textile 17  3089  3,73%
Clothing 18  11592  14,00%
Leather 19  3792  4,58%
Wood products  20  5010  6,05%
Cellulose, paper and printing  21 e 22  5274  6,37%
Coke, fuel  23  166  0,20%
Chemicals 24  3329  4,02%
Pharmaceuticals 25  4968  6,00%
Non-metallic minerals  26  6632  8,01%
Metallurgy and metal products  27 e 28  8727  10,54%
Machinery and equipments  29  5332 6,44%
Electric and electronic machinery and equipment 30, 31, 32, 33  3296  3,98%
Transportation vehicles and others  34 e 35  2360  2,85%
Others 36  e  37  6972  8,42%
Total     82.802  100,00%
 
        Source: own elaboration upon data from PINTEC-IBGE, 2003 CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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